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ABSTRACT 
TECHNOLOGY, PRODUCTION AND TECHNOLOGY PURCHASE IN 
INDIAN INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Industrial firms in low income countries face somewhat different 
incentives for investment in R&D than do firms in industrialized countries. In 
particular, they are at a competitive disadvantage with respect to selling 
technology upstream in the industrialized countries. Technology supplied from 
upstream industrial firms provides them with a strong incentive to purchase 
technology in various forms as opposed to engaging in their own R&D. 
In this study an econometric analysis of the decisions of Indian firms to 
invest in their own R&D and to purchase technology (through licensing agree­
ments) is undertaken. These decisions are treated as being jointly determined 
by characteristics of Indian industries, Indian prices, and the supply of pur­
chasable foreign technology. The study finds that industrial structure, firm 
size, and public and private ownership influence the mix of own R&D and 
technology purchase. The pool of purchasable foreign technology induces both 
increased adaptive R&D and technology purchase by Indian firms. 
TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTION AN!J TECHNOLOGY PURCHASE IN 
INDIAN INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Anil B. Deolalikar and Robert E. Evenson 
1. Introduction 
While there is a large literature on the determinants of 
technological innovation (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975, 1982; Scherer, 
1980, 2986; Griliches, 1984) , most of it has been in the context of 
developed countries, particularly the United States. There is little 
systematic study of the determinants of inventive activity in the 
manufacturing sectors of less-developed countries. Yet in these 
a low level, appears to be· countries inventive activity, although at 
growing rapidly. It is quite possibly an important factor in 
productivity growth in less-developed countries because of the scope for 
complementarity between domestic invention and imitation or adaptation 
of technology from abroad. 
In this paper, we study the determinants of inventive activity in 
the manufacturing sector of India, using industry-level data for the 
period 1960-70. Our approach differs from earlier approaches in that we 
embed the demand for inventive activity in a system of input demand 
equations. Since licensing of foreign technology is an often-used 
alternative (possibly complementary) to in-house research and 
development for firms in less-developed countries, the demand for 
foreign technology is also included in the demand system. This permits 
us to look at the substitutability/complementarity relationships between 
each of theseo-;,,'ll-produced and purchased technology and between 
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technologies and other variable inputs. Since we include variables 
measuring the presence of multinationals, level of international 
inventive activity, size of the public sector, and average firm size in 
the demand equations, we are able to analyze the reduced-form impact of 
these variables on the demand for own-produced and purchased technology. 
To anticipate our empirical results, we find that inventive 
activity is related inversely to average firm size in the Indian 
context. International inventive activity has strong positive effects 
the demand for both local innovation and foreign technology; whichon 
suggests that it increases the pool of inventions that can be both 
imitated within and sold to India. Foreign ownership is associated with 
less local innovation, while state ownership is associated with more 
local innovation, but only in the chemical industries. 
2. Local Innovation and Foreign Technology Purchase in India 
Although the level of inventive activity in India is low relative 
to developed and semi-industrialized countries (e.g., Brazil and South 
Korea), it has been growing quite rapidly over time. Table 1 shows the 
expenditures on research and development (R&D) and on foreign technology 
purchase by all private and public sector companies in India from 
1964-65 to 1969-70. R&D expenditures grew at a trend rate of 26 .O 
percent per annum over this short period. Expenditures on foreign 
1 
technology purchase increased at a rate of 16.2 percent per annum. 
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Table 1. R & D expenditures and payments for foreign technology:_ 
Indian industries, 1964-65 to 1969-70. (In Millions of Rupees) 
R & D Expenditure Royalty and Technical 
Year on Current and Fee Payments for 
Capital Account Foreign Technology 
76.91964-65 105.1 
1965-66 143.7 101.6 
1966-67 178.2 142.4 
133.31967-68 261.7 
1968-69 310.7 162.2 
1969-70 378.5 183.1 
Trend rate of growth 
over the period 26.0 16.2 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Collaborati0n in Indian 




In Table 2, the number of patents granted to Indian nationals -- a 
crude measure of inventive output
2 -- are shown for the period 1954-57 
to 1967-70 for each of 15 major industries. The average rate of growth 
of patenting by nationals was 8.4 percent per annum over the period, 
with no industry experiencing a decline in patenting and almost half of 
, 
the industries experiencing a growth of. patenting in excess of 10 
of the 1960s thus saw a rapid growth ofpercent per annum. The decade 
both inventive activity and foreign te.chnology purchase in Indian 
manufacturing. 
3. The Model 
We use the cost function framework to study the twin demands for 
inventive activity and· foreign technology by firms in manufacturing 
industries. Using the duality theorems of Uzawa (1964), Shepard (1970), 
and McFadden (1978), it is possible to completely describe the nature of 
the production technology from the cost function. In what follows, we 
shall assume that firms minimize the costs of producing a given output 
subject to a production function that can be shifted or altered by 
inventive activity and foreign technology, among other things. 
Duality theory imposes strict restrictions on the specification and 
estimation of factor demand equations. Symmetry restrictions across 
equations arising out of cost-minimizing behavior by economic agents, as 
well as homogeneity restrictions derived from the underlying production 
technology, are generally imposed in the estimation of factor demand 




Table 2. Number of patents granted to nationals in India, by industry 
and year, 1954-57 to 1967-70. 
v..- ..... 
Y e a r Trend rate 
Industry 1954-57 1958-61 1962-66 1967-70 of growth 
from 1954-57 
to 1967-70 
Food processing 26 69 123 , 132 12.4 
Textile manufacturing 52 76 92 86 3.8. 
Jute manufacturing 1 2 4 3 8.9 
Textile products 4 6 9 19 11.9 
Wood products 4 5 7 8 5.6 
Paper and printing 21 28 54 50 7.4 
Leather 22 13 18 23 1.2 
Rubber and plastics 18 33 55 59 9.3 
Chemicals 46 92 137 251 12.7 
Non-metallic rni,neral 
products 25 54 72 85 9.0 
Basic metals 1 2 12 7 17.2 
Metal products 2 7 9 14 14.0 
10 37 48 74 14.4Machinery 
Electrical equipment 4 26 13 16 7.8 
Transport equipment 8 36 34 47 12.0 
All industries 244 486 687 742 8.4 
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estimating a complete demand system, i.e., one in which quantity and 
price data are available for all inputs. In this paper, the presence of 
two inputs inventive activity and foreign technology -- for which 
price data are not ?:"eadily available _necessitates a somewhat flexible 
functional form for the demand system 
Among the three commonly-used flexible functional forms for. cost 
functions, viz., the generalized Leontief, translog, and generalized 
quadratic, only the last yields a system of input demand equations that 
is est~mable with some missing input price data. We, therefore, use the 
generalized quadratic cost function {Fuss, et.al, 1978, Lau, 1978) given 
by: 
2 
(1) C = 1: a.p. + E Eb ..p. {p ./p } + c Q + c Q + ~ d .p .Q + 
i l. l. i j l.J J. J n 1 2 1 1 1 
b .. = b .. V i,j=l, n-1; i~j; 
l.J J1 
which is linear homogeneous in prices, and in which C = total costs, Q = 
total output, pi = price of the i th variable input, and Zk = level 
of the kth fixed factor. 
Using Shephard' s lemma. and differentiating {l) with respect to 
p., we obtain the input demand equations: 
l. 
(2) X. = 3C/3p. = a. + E b .. (p ./p ) + d. Q 
l. l. l. j l.J J n l. 
2 
V i,~ 9ikzk ' 
b .. • b .. , V i,j=l,n-1; i;'j;
l.J J l. 
r 
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where X. = quantity of the ith variable input. It is the system in
l. 
equation (2) that is estimated in this paper. 
In estimating cost-minimizing industry demand equations, two 
important assumptions are maintained. First, implicit in the use of 
industry-level data is the assumption that the average firm in an 
-
industry is representative of all the firms in that industry.. The 
various implications of this assumption have been discussed in a number 
of other studies (Griliches, 1967; Zarembka, 1970; Dennis and Smith, 
1978). However, this practice is common enough in the literature that 
we adopt it here, albeit with the necessary qualifications. Second, it 
is assumed that input prices and output are exogenous variables at the 
industry level. This is not an unreasonable assumption in the Indian 
context, where government intervention in the form of capacity licensing 
and price setting has been very common, at least during the decade of 
the 1960s (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970). It is, therefore, not unrealistic 
to characterize Indian firm behavior as one of minimizing costs for 
given levels of input prices and output. 
The treatment of foreign technology and local inventive activity as· 
variable factors of production requires more justification. These 
activities are normally viewed in a fixed factor or investment 
framework. Our reasons for treating them as variable inputs are 
twofold. First, both activities. have a real element of variability. 
Second, the conventional investment framework has not proved to be very 
illuminating for the questions that we have in mind. 
Technology purchase is quite variable since many of the contractual 
arrangements are quite short term in nature. Technical assistance, for 
\8 I 
example, is often provided only for short periods, and arrangements can 
be changed quite rapidly. Invention by Indian firms also tends to be 
quite adaptive, and, while it has an investment component, the time 
period over which the service flow from the investment is positive is 
relatively short. This is because "follow-on" adaptive inventions erode 
the rents associated with any given invention. Indian inventions have a 
high degree of erosion relative to inventions in developed countries 
because almost all invention is adaptive. It takes the form of a 
modification of other inventions. A large flow of developed country 
inventions then induces a high rate of adapted inventions, many of which 
do not qualify for patent protection. Those qualifying for patent 
protection tend to have a very short economic life. 
4. Data and Estimation 
The variables used in the analysis, and their means and standard 
deviations, are listed in Table 3 (see Appendix for data sources). A 
total of five variable inputs are included: production labor, 
non-production labor, fuel, patenting in India by nationals, and royalty 
and technical fee payments for foreig~ technology. Capital is treated 
as a fixed factor, since government capacity licensing makes capital 
stock exogenous to the firm's decisions, at least in the short run. 
While data on production labor are available in man-hours, data on 
non-production labor are available only in numbers of employees. 
Patenting by nationals in India is used as a proxy for local inventive 
input (and not for inventive output, as it is the case in much of the 
9 
. literature} , since industry-specific data on R&D expenditures or R&D 
personnel are not available for the period 1960-70. While patenting is 
a crude proxy for inventive activity, particularly in India where a 
system of utility models or "petty" patents {minor adaptive inventions} 
does not exist, almost all other quantitative measures of inventive 
activity, including R&D expenditures, are also likely to be crude 
proxies for inventive input~ Most of the R&D conducted in 
less-developed countries is informal or 'blue-collar' R&D, which is 
largely. conducted outside the formal R&D divisions of companies. 
Foreign technology input is proxied by the total payments made by 
firms in an industry to foreign suppliers for the purchase of know-how 
as well as·or technology. The payments include both royalties 
(lump-sum} technical fees. The specification of foreign technology in 
Weexpenditure (instead of quantity} terms is forced on us by the data. 
do not have industry-specific data on, say, the number of foreign 
technology collaborations. However, it could be argued that the foreign 
technology variable we use is sensitive to quality differentials in 
that the number oftechnologies purchased across industries in a way 
foreign technology collaborations would not be. Of course, the 
interpretation of our empirical results will be affected by the 
specification of the foreign technology variable in expenditure terms. 
We note that, even if the number of patents and payments for foreign 
technology are poor proxies for local inventive activity and foreign 
technology, respectively, since they are treated as .dependent variables 
in our analysis, errors of measurement in these variables are part of 
the general error structure of the model. 
r 
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Table 3. Variables means: Indian industries, 1960-70. 
Industries 
f
Chemfcale Engineering All 
Production labora (in man-hours) 687,635 1,092,343 864,790 836,425 
Number of non-production workersa 32 112 252 122 
Fuel consumption(= Rupee Expenditure 
on Fuel ~ Fuel Price lndex)a 1,143 12-,955 3,341 4,509 
Technology imports (Royalty & 
technical fee payments in Rupees 33,510 57,451 948,175 339,492 
for foreign know-how}a 
Domestic patenting (No. of patents x 1000 
granted to nationals .in lndia)a 432 183 215 305 
W (Hourly wage rate in Rupees 
tCr production 1abor) 0.52 1.00 0.83 0.73 
WN (Annual wage rate in Rupees 
for non-production workers) 3,948 8,073 5,119 5,256 
PF (Price index for fuel)b 120 120 120 120 
USPATNTS {Cum. no. of patents granted 
in USA over previous 5 years)a 126 326 1,389 586 
FORSHARE (Share of equity held by 
foreigners during 1965-70)c 26.81 13.63 23.22 22.68 
PUBSHARE (Share of production in 
public-sector enterprises during· 
1970-73)c 3.70 15.75 18~17 11.15 
FIXEDCAP (Fixed capital stock 
a
in Rupees) 1,008,852 19,517,808 4,217,698 6,241,176 
OUTPUT (Gross output in Rupees) 
a 
5,150,564 25,268,988 6,224,962 10,005,713 
Number of observations 192 96 -141 429 
aVariable has been divided by the total number of firms in the industry. The variable means, therefore, 
b refer to the average firm in the industry. 
Variable varies only with time. 
cTfme-fnvariant variable. 
dlncludes all food manufacturing, beverage, tobacco, textile spinning and weaving, and knitting 
industries.e . 
Includes basic industrial chemicals. (including fertilizer), pharmaceuticals, miscellaneous chemical 
f products, petroleum and coal products, and cement industries. 
Includes metal products, machinery, electrical machinery and equipment, transport equipment, railroad 
equipment, and automobile and cycle industries. 
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We use data on three prices, viz., wage rates for production labor, 
wage rates for non-production employees, and price (index) of fuel. The 
latter varies only over time, not across industries. The fixed factors 
included in the demand system are fixed capital stock, share of industry 
equity held by foreigners, share of industry output produced in 
public-sector 9r state-owned firms, and the cumulative number of patents 
granted within the same industry in the United States (to both nationals 
and foreigners) during the previous five-year period. In addition, all 
of the preceding four variables are included in quadratic (i.e., 
squared) form in the demand equations to capture nonlinearities in 
demand with respect to the exogenous variables. 
The· number of patents granted in the United States is a proxy for 
the supply of international inventions or technology. Insofar as the 
demand for foreign technology by Indian firms may be constrained by the 
pool or supply of internationally-available technologies, it is 
important to include the latter in the demand system. Additionally, 
insofar as much of Indian inventive activity involves modification and 
adaptation of technologies already developed elsewhere, the 
international supply of technology may act as a constraint to Indian 
inventive activity as well. The impact of international inventions on 
the demand for foreign technology and domestic inventive activity in 
Indian manufacturing has important policy implications and is an 
important concern of this paper. 
The total sample includes observations on 50 three- and four-digit 
manufacturing industries over the period 1960-70. The sample of 
industries has been divided into three groups: light industries, 
1 2 
comprising food processing, beverages and tobacco, textile spinning and 
weaving, and knitting industries; chemical industries, comprising basic 
industrial chemicals (including fertilizer), miscellaneous chemical 
products, pharmaceuticals, petroleum and coal products, and cement 
industries; and engineering industries, comprising metal products, 
machinery, electrical machinery and equipment, transport equipment, and 
automobile and cycle industries. For estimation purposes, 
cross-sectional and time-series data have been pooled within each of the 
three groups. We thus assume a high degree of similarity of 
technologies within each of the three industry groups. A full set of 
in the demand equationsthree~digit industry dummies has been included 
to isolate industry shift effects. 
Since the industry-level variable are totals over a varying number 
of firms in each industry, all dependent and independent. variables, with 
the exception of the output share of the public sector and the equity 
share of the foreign sector, have been divided by the number of firms in 
the industry. This removes a potential source of heteroscedasticity in 
the residuals of the demand equations. 
The systems in equation (2) have been estimated jointly by the 
iterative seemingly-unrelated regressions (ITSUR} (Zellner, 1963) method 
to take account of error interdependence and symmetry restrictions 
across equations. ITSUR provides consistent: and efficient estimates for 
the demand system parameters. Note that since all the prices have been 
divided by the price of fuel (to impose homogeneity of degree zero in 
prices), the symmetry restrictions in effect apply only to the 
production and non-production labor demand equations. 
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S. Results 
The regression results for the light, chemical, and engineering 
industries are presented in Appendix Tables Al-A3, respectively. The 
own and cross price elasticities of input demand, being more easily 
interpretable,-are calculated and shown in Table 4. The elasticities of 
input demand with respect to output and the fixed factors of production 
are shown in Table 5 for the three industry groups. Below we summarize 
the main findings from thesa tables. 
The empirical results are generally consistent with the predictions 
of production theory. For instance, out of a total of nine own-price 
·elasticities estimated (three for each industry group), only one has the 
wrong sign (and even this is not significant). Six of the nine 
own-price elasticities are significantly less than zero, as the cost 
function model predicts. Further, with the exception of domestic 
patenting, all inputs have positive output elasticities, as would be 
expected of non-inferior inputs. 
Patenting by nationals does not appear to be significantly 
responsive to prices, except in the case of light industries. Even in 
these industries, the price elasticities, although statistically 
significant, are numerically small. They suggest that local inventive 
activity is complementary to both production and nonproduction labor but 
substitutable for fuel. On the other hand, foreign technology appears 
to be a strong substitute for pr.oduction labor and fuel in the light and 
engineering industries, but is not significantly related to 
nonproduction labor. The results thus suggest that the foreign 
. .. · ...,-. 
r 
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technology being used in India, ·at least in the light and engineering 
industries, is of the (production} labor- and fuel-saving type. 
International inventive activity, as proxied by the cumulative 
number of patents granted in the United States over the previous 
five-year period, has very strong positive effects on inventive activity 
within India. For instance, the elasticity of Indian· patenting. with 
respect to U.S. patenting is greater than one in the light industries 
and greater than two in the chemical industries. (The elasticity is not 
significantly different from zero in the engineering industries.) These 
results merit further discussion. 
To the extent that patents provide intellectual property protection 
for a patent recipient, they block other firms from 'reinventing' or 
patenting the same invention. However, a patent also discloses 
important information about an invention to the public. Since the 
protection provided by patents is rarely complete, other firms can use 
this public information to 'invent' a parallel product/process and 
patent it. The extent to which a patent granted to one firm retards or 
promotes patenting by other firms then depends on which of the two 
effects -- blocking or disclosure dominates. Exactly the same 
effects operate at the international level. To the extent that American 
(and other) firms patent their inventions in the U.S. to block Indiar. 
(and other) firms from reinventing the same.product or process~ there is 
a (negative) blocking effect of U.S. patenting on Indian patenting. 
However, U.S. patenting also can have a (positive) disclosure effect 
whereby Indian firms can learn of an invention which they would 
otherwise no_t have known about, modify it, and patent an adapted version 
_ o. l 
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Table 4, Own- and cross-price elasticities of input demand: Indian industries, 1960-70.a, b, c 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Elasticit,:t of 
Industry With Production Non-Production Technology Domestic 
Group Respect to: Labor Labor Fuel Imports Patenting 










-0,727 -0.390 1.562 -0.443 -0.001w~ 
(-6.7) (-5.7) (5.5) (-1 .s) (-4.4) 
-0.512 0.039 -2.449 2.919 0.002PF 
(-1.6) (0.2) ( -3 .1 ) (3.5) (2.9) 
Chemical -0.893 0.093 0.803 -0.004 0.001WP 
(-5. 7) (0.9) (3.8) (-1.6) {0.6) 
0.110 -0.344 0.237 -0.004 0.001WN 
(0.9) (-2.3) (1.0) (-1. 2) (0.9) 
p -d.330 0.486 -0.155 -0.000 -0.001 
F 
(-1 • 1 } {2.5) (-0.4) (-0.0) (-0.4) 
Engineering WP -0.196 -0.250 0.057 0.389 -0.001 
(-1.2) (-2 ,6) (0.4) (4.1) (-0.8) 
-0.143 -3.887 3.914 0.115 0.001WN 
(-2.6) (-10,6) (7 .4) (0.3) (0.2) 
-0.948 0,064 0.509 0.375 0.001PF 
(-2.5) (0.3) (1.4) (1.7) (0.4) 
Notes: 
aElasticities have been evaluated at the sample means of each industry group. The coefficients 
used in calculating the elasticities ~re reported in Appendix Tables A1-A3. 
bSince all prices have been normalized by the fuel price in the estimated equation, no symmetry 
has been imposed between the fuel price effects on labor demand and the wage effects on fuel 
demand. As such, the signs of these effects may not be the same, 
cThe t·statistics calculated are only approximate since they only take account of the variance of 
the estimated coefff~ie~ts and not of the predicted values of the random variables, 
1 6 


























PUBSHARE 0.330* 0.010 Q.317* -0.258 O.Oil 
FIXEDCAP 0.658* 0.617* 0.830* -0.248 -0.013 
OUTPUT 0.297* 0.242* 0.453* 0.114 -0.108* 
TIMEc -0.092* -0.015* -0.056* 0.181* 0.101* 
Chemical USPATNTS -0.012 0.099 -0.065 1.107* 2.120* 
FORSHAREb -0.014* -0.013 0.006 -0.011 -0.12()-k 
o.oso 0.026 0.216*PUBSHAREb 0.007 0.007 
FIXEDCAP 0.947* 1.075* 0.664* -0.157 0.464 
0.021 0.025 -0.809*OUTPUT 0.260* 0.622* 
TIMEc -0.105* -0.073* -0.068* 0.167 0.111* 
0.051 0.557* 0.196Engineering USPATNTS -0.059 0.055 
FORSHAREb 0.105* 0.111 0.101 0.095 0.027 
PUBSHAREb -0.030* -0.039* -0.020* 0.001 0.030 
0.123 -0.356 -0.655*FIXEDCAP 0.785* 0.360 
0.499OUTPUT 0.169* 0.553 0.827* 0.391* 
TIMEc -0.040* -0.338* -0.046 -0.038 -0.114* 
Notes: 
8 
Elasticities have been evaluated at the sample means of each industry group using the 
coefficients reported in Appendix Tables A1-A3. 
bThe figures in these rows are partial elasticities. That is 1 they show the per cent change in 
the dependent variable due to a one percentage point increase in the independent variable. 
CThe figures in this row show the trend rate of change of the dependent variable (per cent per 
annum). 
*Significant at the 0.10 level of significance or lower. The tests of _significance are only 
approximate since the t-statistics only take account of the variance of the estimated 
coefficients and not of the predicted values of the random variables. 
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in India. (Disclosure, while required in patent documents, is often 
of the product to the market.) By increasingprovided by the exposure 
the pool of knowledge from which to learn, imitate and adapt, 
international inventions can stimulate Indian inventive activity. The 
net effect of international. inventive activity on Indian inventive 
activity will thus depend on the·relative magnitudes of the blocking and 
suggest that the disclosuredisclosure effects. Our empirical results 
effect significantly dominates the blocking effect in the Indian case. 
The fact that the elasticity of Indian patenting with respect to U.S. 
patenting is significantly larger in the chemical sector than in the 
light or engineering sectors probably reflects the lower appropriability 
· of inventions (from the point of view of the inventor firm) in the 
chemical/pharmaceuticals industries. It is well known that infringement 
or side-stepping of patents is much easier in these than in other 
industries. 
The impact of international inventive activity on the demand for 
foreign technology will indicate the extent to which local inventive 
activity and foreign technology are substitutes or complements in Indian 
a and pervasivemanufacturing. The econometric results indicate strong 
positive effect of international inventions on the demand for foreign 
technology across all industry groups. In the case of light and 
chemical industries, the elasticity of demand for foreign technology 
with respect to international inventions is approximately one, while it 
is about O. 6 in the case of engineering industries. These results 
suggest that foreign technology acquisition and local inventive activity 
ate complementary to each other in Indian manufacturing. This has 
r 
18 
important implications for government policies on import of foreign 
technology and know-how. 
Since we have used expenditure, not quantity, as our dependent 
. 
variable, the elasticity we have estimated may be a hybrid of the true 
demand elasticity and the elasticity of the "price" per unit of foreign 
technology with respect to international inventions. In this case, we 
may not be able to interpret the estimated elasticity as a demand 
elasticity. However, since an increase in international inventions is 
likely to lower the "price" of foreign technology to Indian firms, given 
competitiv:e international technology markets, the true elasticity of 
( 
demand for foreign technology with respect to international inventions 
is likely to be even greater than the one (expenditure 
elasticity) estimated here. Our finding that foreign technology 
acquisition and local inventive activity are complementary thus holds. 
Foreign and state ownership are not associated significantly with 
the demand for domestic patenting or foreign technology, except in the 
case of the chemical industries where domestic patenting is related 
inversely to foreign ownership and positively to state ownership. The 
negative foreign ownership effect may reflect the propensity of 
subsidiaries of multinational drug companies in India to use innovations 
developed by their parent companies, often at great cost, and avoid 
3
local R&D in India. However; since our results do not show a 
positive association between acquisition of forej,gn technology and the 
extent of foreign ownership, it is not clear how much credence can be 
placed in this explanation. 
r 
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The positive state ownership effect on domestic· patenting in the 
chemical sector is most likely the result of two large state-owned 
corporations Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals and Hindustan 
Antibiotics -- being included in this industry group. Both corporations 
were set up in the late 1950s to reduce India's dependence on foreign 
technology and on multinational drug companies, and therefore, had a 
mandate to engage in substantial R&D activity. 
Finally, the relationship between inventive activity and firm size 
is of interest, since it has produced a large literature in the context 
of developed countries. The general evidence from these countries is 
that, with the possible exception of the chemical industry, the 
intensity of research effort (i.e., research effort deflated by a 
measure of firm size) does not increase with firm size. This implies 
that the elasticity of· research effort with respect. to firm size is 
positive but less than unity (Worley 1961, Hamberg 1966, Mueller 1967, 
Mansfield 1968). In some cases, research intensity is found to 
initially increase, but then decrease, with firm size (again with the 
possible exception of the chemical industry) (Scherer 1965a, Grabowski 
1968). Most of the above studies have used R&D expenditure as 
percentage of sales or R&D employees as percentage of total employees as 
their dependent variables. Studies that have used patents as a measure 
of inventive activity have generally found the relationship between the 
absolute number of patents granted and firm size to be of an inverted 
U-shape type (Scherer 1965b, Johannisson and Lindstrom 1971). This 
suggests that " ••••beyond some magnitude, size does not appear 




this country or in European countries where studies have been 
conducted•••• It seems noteworthy that the chemical industry is cited 
as an exception both for the U.S. and abroad" (Kamien and Schwartz, 
1975: 19). 
In this paper, both fixed capital stock and output provide a 
measure of firm size. Even the absolute level of domestic patenting is 
observed to decline with output in the light and chemical industries and 
with fixed capital stock in the engineering industries. These results 
imply that the intensity of patenting (i.e., patenting per unit of firm 
size) declines very sharply with firm size in Indian manufacturing. The 
decline is sharpest in the chemical industries, followed by the 
· engineering and the light industries (in that order). On the other 
hand, the demand for foreign technology does not appear to be 
significantly related to firm_size, except in the engineering industries 
where it increases with output. However, since this elasticity is less 
than one, the intensity of foreign technology use still declines with 
output. 
Several other interesting findings relating to the demand for labor 
and fuel emerge from the empirical analysis. However, a detailed 
discussion of these results is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied the determinants of local inventive 
activity and foreign technology use in the manufacturing sector of 
tndia, using a cost function framework and industry-level data for the 
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period 1960-70. International· inventive activity, proxied by the 
cumulative number of patents granted in the United States during the 
preceding five years, emerges as the strongest determinant of local 
inventive activity, proxied by the number of patents granted to 
nationals in India. In fact the elasticity of domestic patenting with 
respect to U.S. patenting is greater than one in the light indus.tries 
and greater than two in the chemicals industries. These results 
indicate a strong diffusion of inventions from the United States to 
India, and suggest that the disclosure effect of U.S. patenting 
same time, the demand fordominates.over the blocking effect. At the 
foreign technology in Indian manufacturing also appears to be strongly 
stimulated by international inventions. 
The finding that the flow of international technology stimulates 
Indian invention should lead to a possible reevaluation of Indian patent 
policy. India undertook steps to weaken its patent system in 1970 in 
part because it sought to reduce foreign influence and technological 
wasdependency. Our results, which cover the period before this policy 
implemented, however, suggest that the legal and institutional setting 
in India during the 1960s was quite conducive to enabling both local 
inventive activity and foreign technology purchase to benefit from 
international invention. Indeed, a weak patent policy may well have 
stifled the stimulus that foreign inventiqn provides in · enabling both 
more effective technology purchase from abroad and domestic adaptive 
R&D. Further study, using post-1970 data, is required to determine 
whether this indeed happened. Further study is also required to 
determine the effects of general industrial policies, such as trade 
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protection and capacity licensing, on the demand for foreign technology 
and local inventive activity. 
The finding that foreign technology use and local inventive 
activity are complementary to each other also underscores the importance 
of a liberal technology import policy. The Indian government has been 
pragmatic in this respect; it has adopted a fairly flexible posture 
toward foreign technical collaborations, and has encouraged foreign 
technology purchase by Indian firms. 
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However, we alone are responsible for any errors of omission or 
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1Expend"1tures are in. current terms. Inflation rates in India 
were low over the period -- less than 4 per cent per year. 
2 
see Griliches (1987) for a survey of the literature which uses 
patent statistics as economic indicatos. 
3our colleague, T.N. Srivivasan points out that in addition to 
capacity licensing, the Indian government controlled the allocation 
of some imported inputs. We acknowledge that if this rationing of 
inputs was substantial, our cost function treatment is not appropriate. 
We believe, however, that it was not so severe as to call for a rationing 
or fixed factor approach to the inputs that we consider to be variable. 
It primarily affected capital stocks which we treat as fixed in the model. 
· 4rhe "price" of technology purchased abroad is also variable and 
24 
.and constitutes a type of annual rental payment for a service flow. 
5We acknowledge that we cannot argue that technology purchases and 
own R&D do not have some investment component. We are faced with the 
choice of treating these activities in the variable factor framework 
as in a quasi-fixed factor investment framework. The latter frame­
work is not well suited to addres~ing the joint choice of technology 
purchase and own R&D. 
6T~N. Srinivasan notes that the Indian government has placed 
some restrictions on technology inports into India. These will 
affect technology purchases and own R&D. Our demand function for 
these activities have to be interpreted subject to these restrictions. 
We do not have information on the extent of these restrictions or on 
their changes over time. The time trends in the equations and the 
division of firms into 3 broad industry groups partially addresses 
the problem presented by restrictions on technology imports. 
27The weighted R 's for cash system indicates a high proportion 
of variance explained by the estimates. 
8we have not attempted to specify the lag structure behind this 
affect. We have imposed a 5 year lag on the international patent 
stock. Indian R&D response may also have a lag. It should also 
be noted that the marketing of a new product based on these patents 
will also provide disclosure effects. 
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9rn a survey of U.S.~based multinational corporations, Mansfield, 
et.al. (1979) found that 29-34 per cent of the profit returns from the 
R&D projects of these corporations on pverage came from overseas exploi­
tation. The corporations estimated that their R&D budgets would be 
reduced by 12-15 per cent if they were unable to pass innovations on 




1 Data on technology imports and on foreign equity share were 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Collaboration in 
Indian Industry: Survey Report, Bombay: Rese~e Bank of India, 1968 
for the period 1960-61 to 1963-64, and from the Reserve Bank of 
India, Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry: Second Survey 
Report 1974, Bombay: Reserve Bank of India, 1974, for the period 
1~64-65 to 1969-70. 
2 Data on the fuel price index was obtained from India, Planning 
Division, Basic StatisticsCommission, Statistics and Surveys 
Relating to the Indian Economy 1950-51 to 1970-:-71, New Delhi, 1972. 
3 Data on the public sector in production was obtained from the 
CommerceCommerce Yearbook of the Public Sector, Bombay: 
Publications, 1974. 
4 Data on number of patents granted in the u.s. were obtained, 
tabulated by industry, directly from the U.S. Patent Office. 
on patenting by nationals in India were hand-tabulated5 Data 
directly from actual patent applications on file at the New Delhi 
office of the Indian Patent Office. Data on approximately 42,000 
patents granted through 1979 were collected. A relatively complete 
concordance of the Indian· patent classification with the Indian 
industrial classification was also possible. Only 5,845 of the 
41,588 patents in the basic file were in classes where assignments 
to industries prQved unreasonable. 
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1) All five equations have been estimated jointly by the iterative seemingly-unrelated 
regressions method. Symmetry restrictions across the first two equations, as well 
as zero homogeneity in prices for each equation, have been imposed. Asymptotic 
t·statistics are in parentheses. 
2) A full set of three-digit industry dummies as well as an intercept were included 
fn each equation. The coefficients on these terms have not been reported in 
the table due to space limitations. 
3) For a description of the ;ariables·, see Table 3. 
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ITSUR estimates of input demand equations: chemical industries, India, 1960
-70.
Appendix Table A2. 
Independent Production Non-Production Techno
logy Domestic 
Fuel Imports PatentingVariables Labor Labor 
·513,440 1,202,555 1,386-116,490,552 1,492 
(-5.1) (0.8) (-1.0) (0.1) (0.1) 
-
1,492 -0.58 93.18 -1,105 -0.92 
(-2 .1) (2.3) (-1. 3) (-0.8)(0.8) 
201 0.04 -2.62 231 1.35USPATNTS 
(0.6) (0.8) {-0.4) (1.6) (6.7) 
USPATNTS -638 -0.13 0.43 
-570 -2.76 
4 (-1 .4) (-5.0)
Squared (X10) (-0.6) (-0.9) (0.0) 
I ; 
-3,414 -57.90
FORSHARE -37,879 -3.87 -1.38 
(-1 .5) (-1 .1) (-0.0) (-0.3) (-4.0) 
813 0.09 2.77 101 1.33FORSHARE 
(0.2) (0.4) (3.7)Squared (1.3) (1.0) 
409 4,327 22.53PUBSHARE 23,905 1.48 co. 7) (2.5)(1.5) (0.7) (1.3) 
-524 -0.02 7 .56 -89.81 -0.52PUBSHARE 
0 
(-1 .5) (-0.5) (-1.1 ) (-0.7) (-2.7)Squared 
681 0.08 S.54 3.72 0.05FIXE~CAP
(X10) (9.1) (7.3) (3.8) 
(0.1) (1.3) 
-390 -0.03 -2.91 -21.39 -0.03FIXEDCAP 12 (-0.6)
Squared (X10 ) (-4.4) (-2.8) (-1.7)
 (-0.6) 
o.oo 3.19 0.57 -0.06112OUTPf 
(4.1 ) (0.0) (-2.6)(X10) (2.9) (0.2) 
TIME ·115,240 -8.24 -879 
9,595 20.06 
(2.2)(-7.0) (-3.6) (-2.7) (1.5) 
Note$: 
All five equations have been estimated jointly by the iterative seemingly-u
nrelated
1) 
regressions method. Symmetry restrictions across equations (1) and (2), as 
well as 
Asymptoticzero homogeneity in prices for each equation, have been imposed. 
t•$tatistics are in parentheses. 
2) A full set of three-digit industry du1m1ies as well as an intercept were 
included 
in each equation. The coefficients on these terms have not been reported in
 
the table due to space limitations. 
3) For a description of the variables, see Table 3. 
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ITSUR estimates of input demand equations: engineering industries, India, 1
960-70.
Appendix Table A3. 
Independent Production Non-Production Technolog
y Domestic 
Imports PatentingVariables Labor Labor Fuel 
-23,671,437 -4,913 -442,899 68,330,770 17,727 
(1.3) (0.9)( -1.1 ) (-2.4) (-2.4) 
-4,913 -21.79 4.83 -13,359 -2.29 
(2.4) (-10.0) (0.3) (-2.6) (-1.3) 
396 0.01USPATNTS -35.36 0.01 0.15 
(-0.7) (0.2) (0.4) (3.2) (0.02) 
USPATNTS -5.42 -0.01 -0.11 -57
.19 0.07 
4 (-0.3) (-0.6) {2.1)Squared (X10) (-0.1) (-0.2) 
142 6,290 778,779 146FORSHARE 1,688,754 
(3.8) (0.3) (1.6) (0.7) ( 0.4) 
-128 -14,822 -3.04FORSHARE -34,416 -2.46 
(-1.7) (-0.6) (-0.4)Squared (-3.9) (-0.3) 
-100 2,243 9.65PUBSHARE -48,569 -14.82 
(-6.9) (-1.8) (-1 .6) (0.1) (1.5) 
0.88 -24.32 -0.08PUBSHARE 618.63 0.14 
(8.3) (1.6) (1.4) (-0.1) (-1.3)Squared 
-938 -0.39
FIXE~CAP 1,853 0.06 
3.21 
(0.2) (1.5) (-1.5) (-1.8)(X10) ·c1. 1> 
0.12 -4.27 1,683 · 0.52FIXEDCAP -2,876
12 (1.2)
Squared (X10 ) (-6.0) (0.2) (-1.0) 
(1.4) 
595 0.18235 0.22 4.44OUTP~T 
(3.9) (1.8) ( 1.5)(X10) (1.8) (1.5) 
-85.39 -153 -36,048 -25.10TIME -34,721 (-1. 7)(-2 .1 ) (-4.4) (-1. 1) (-0.8) 
Notes: 
All five equations have been estimated jointly by the iterative seemingly-u
nrelated
1) 
regressions method. Symmetry restrictions across equations (1) and (2), as
 well as 
Asymptoticzero homogeneity in prices for each equation, have been imposed. 
t·statistics are in parentheses. 
2) A full set of three-digit industry du1TV11ies as well as an intercept were
 included 
in each equation. The coefficients on these terms have not been reported i
n 
· the tab1 e due to space 1) mi tat ions. 
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